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Abstract
Government and business interact in various ways in the economy; this paper marks an attempt at
a positive treatment of the policy issue. The starting point is the ﬁrm, as elementary unit of manufac-
turing production. The end result is some superior socio-economic outcome, revealing a development
process under way. As the attainment of the end result mobilizes a large number of economic agents
beside the ﬁrm, a formal depiction of the economy is required. The deliberate actions undertaken
by the public sector as part of the strategy are referred to as ‘industrial policy’. Those that relate
to individual acts by the ﬁrms are called ‘business plans’. The original setting is that of an Arrow-
Debreu economy. Critical departures from the standard assumptions of the reference model invite
the parallel recourse to a game-theoretic approach in a partial equilibrium setting. Several classes of
non-cooperative games and related equilibria are reviewed, up to the general form of dynamic games
of imperfect information. The informational content of a game receives special attention: jointly ob-
servable signals are shown to enhance the potential outcome of a game of imperfect information, and
the paper concludes with the broad speciﬁcations of a public communication device to circumvent
data constraints.
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1Introduction
“As subsidies remain one of the last resorts of government intervention that not only risks distorting competi-
tion but also represents a non-negligible part of public spending, the level of state aid needs to be ﬁrmly kept
under control”, Commission of the European Communities, Seventh Survey on State Aid in the
Manufacturing and Certain Other Sectors, March 1999
However cryptic in its formulation, the quotation betrays a widespread distrust of the ultimate
beneﬁts of public subsidies, and for that matter, of government intervention in general. Subsidies are
deemed distorting and expensive, and they probably deserve the blame. Yet they remain a ﬁxture of
the economic landscape in industrialized as well as in developing countries: in the OECD area, public
subsidies to manufacturing industry amount to some US$50 billion every year. Firms are eager to
solicit them, and governments are keen to oblige. Surely they must conceal some compelling appeal
that underwrites their prolonged existence. The controversy is particularly intense in the manufacturing
sector, where it has spawned over the last decade a proliﬁc literature between proponents of government
intervention and ‘laissez-faire’ hard-liners, on the merits and failings of industrial policy. Occasional
bursts of fresh empirical evidence over the period have further confused the debate, and sent policy-
makers and academics alike scurrying for new analytical prototypes, consistent with a wider range of
real-life applications.
The polemic to a large extent originates from ideological considerations: in the absence of a
universally acceptable deﬁnition, the proponents of industrial policy start with a pre-conceived idea of
the particular role of the state in economic aﬀairs, that reﬂects their subjective views on the construct
of society. For instance, governments must protect the consumer by preventing the emergence of private
monopolies (hence industrial policies equate with anti-trust regulations); or they must steer resources to
the creation of dynamic comparative advantages, say, in the ship-building industry; or they must ‘oﬀset
market failures’ and ﬁll in the gaps left by private ﬁrms in a market economy.
Thus the economic rationale for government intervention often follows a ‘backward induction’
argument, from a normative deﬁnition of the scope of industrial policy, onto the shortfall in the underlying
economic model that would eventually justify a public intervention of this particular kind. In other
words, the argument becomes contingent upon the subjective choice of its proponent, on two counts: the
reference to an —arbitrary— deﬁnition of industrial policy, and the reliance on an —arbitrary— formal
representation of economic phenomena.
In contrast, this paper marks an attempt at a positive treatment of the policy issue. The starting
point is the ﬁrm, as the basic unit of manufacturing production. The end result is some superior socio-
economic outcome, revealing a development process under way. As the attainment of the end result
mobilizes a large number of economic agents beside the ﬁrm, a formal depiction of the economy is
required.
No further speciﬁcation of ‘superior socio-economic outcome’ is necessary at this stage. The passage
from the observed to the target situation, whatever it may be, depicts an industrial strategy. A particular
strategy can be to deepen the country’s technological capabilities, to strengthen the competitiveness of
domestic industries, or to distribute more evenly the beneﬁts of manufacturing progress. It can be deﬁned
at national, regional, local or district level; it will eventually materialize through a combination of steps
2taken by the ﬁrms, their business partners, and the public sector. The deliberate actions undertaken
by the public sector as part of the strategy are referred to as ‘industrial policy’. Those that relate to
individual acts by the ﬁrms are called ‘business plans’.
The paper will progressively substantiate this concept of industrial policy following a most gen-
eral, axiomatic approach: minimal assumptions will be made on the agents, their behaviour and the
mechanisms that govern economic interactions between them. The practical relevance of the axiomatic
argumentation is established through occasional links to concrete applications, labelled ‘hii’ (i = 1,...,6)
in the text, and treated in Section 6. The theory will then proceed to highlight a number of instances
where the mechanisms at play fail to bring about the desired outcome, and invite the recourse to a public
intervention.
Section 1 reviews the basic tenets of an Arrow-Debreu economy, and the characteristics of the
equilibrium it leads to. Section 2 looks into the mechanism supporting the equilibrium and thus, paves
the way for subsequent game-theoretic analysis. Section 3 highlights some of the signiﬁcant departures
from the pure competitive case, while Section 4 introduces the time dimension in the form of repeated
games. In both static and dynamic games, an exchange of information among players can improve
their respective payoﬀs: Section 5 introduces the concept of a public communication device. Selected
applications are then proposed in Section 6; they highlight, inter alia, the complexity of the actual
decision-making process and hence, of policy formulation in support of industrial growth. Section 7
brings the discourse to an end by brieﬂy listing the main quantitative tools presently available for policy
design and suggesting an alternative mechanism for decision-making in transition economies, consistent
with the underlying non-cooperative game yet moral hazard-resilient.
1 The base paradigm
Consider a ﬁnite economy with ` commodities h, m consumers i, and n ﬁrms j1. In a Euclidean space R`
ﬁtted with the necessary vectorial and topological properties, a ﬁrm j is depicted by a production set Yj,
which represents all technically feasible combinations of inputs and outputs. A consumer i is characterized
by a consumption set Xi of all realistically possible combinations of commodities. Furthermore, we posit
that Xi is completely pre-ordered by i, a binary relation of preference between commodity bundles.
Let Y =
P
j Yj (resp. X =
P
i Xi) be the aggregate production (resp. consumption) set of the
economy, with of course Y,X ⊂ R`. Assume in this ﬁrst section that no singularity occurs. In particular,
Xi, Yi, X, Y are convex sets with smooth boundaries for all i, j. There are no production externalities,
and preference pre-orderings translate into convex indiﬀerence classes. The State is a producer among
others.
At any time, the situation of the j-th ﬁrm may be identiﬁed by a point yj = (+yj,−yj) in R`,
where the +yj component (resp. −yj) accounts for j’s outputs (resp. inputs) at yj. Note that in a real
world, and critically so in transition economies, yj is likely to be an interior point of Yj.
Let p be the `-vector of prices prevailing in our economy. p is taken as given by all producers j,
as, under the standard assumption of the theory, none of them has the bargaining power to inﬂuence the
1the extension of the analysis to the continuum case requires producers and consumers to be identiﬁed as elements of
a measure space (T ,θ,µ), where θ is the σ-algebra of coalitions in T and µ is the measure. However, we will restrict our
analysis to a ﬁnite economy.
3market prices. p measures the economic value of all goods and services, inputs and outputs alike. More-
over, since in an Arrow-Debreu economy commodities are dated and located, p also carries information
on interest and exchange rates, inter alia.
Given the posted price vector p and the supply yj, their inner product p.yj = πj is a scalar
measuring the diﬀerence between j’s sales (or market value of outputs) and its costs (or market value of
inputs). Thus j measures the net value of j’s activity, or j’s proﬁt.
The theory furthermore assumes that the ﬁrm’s behaviour is steered by an objective of proﬁt
maximization under the constraint of a given technology. In other words, the j-th ﬁrm will seek a
production pattern y∗
j such that p.y∗
j ≥ p.yj for all yj ∈ Yj, and y∗
j ∈ Yj. Deﬁne then in R` a class of
hyperplanes H, with H = {z,z
0
∈ R` | p.(z − z
0
) = 0}. p is clearly normal to H, in fact p = ∇H.
By Minkowski’s theorem of separating hyperplanes, the optimal production pattern of j is y∗
j, with
y∗
j ∈ H and y∗
j ∈ ¯ Yj the closure of Yj in R`. It is therefore proﬁt-improving for the ﬁrm j to move from
yj to y∗
j, and the vector
− − − − − − →
(yj − y∗
j) indicates the shortest route to do so.
We had assumed earlier that at individual level, none of the producers had the power to inﬂuence
the prices (i.e. the producers were strictly price-takers). However, it is clear that at aggregate level, the
total supply y∗ will both depend on, and inﬂuence, the prices. In other words, y∗ = φy(p) and p = ψy(y∗).
Note that so far, we have concentrated only on the supply-side of the market. One may reach similar
conclusions looking now at the demand-side of the market, with an aggregate demand x∗ = φx(p) and
p = ψx(x∗).
The central result of general equilibrium theory lies with the existence proof of a ﬁxed point break-
ing that circularity and meshing producers’ and consumers’ decentralized plans. Loosely speaking, the
proof of the existence theorem starts with the deﬁnition of an excess demand z = x−y as a correspondence
z = ζ(p) from the price space onto the commodity space, with z∗ = 0 at the market-clearing equilibrium.
The question now revolves around the existence of p∗ such that ζ(p∗) 3 0 while satisfying p∗ = µ(z∗).
Under the assumptions of the model, ζ(•) is an upper semi-continuous correspondence from a non-empty,
compact, convex set onto itself. It therefore satisﬁes the conditions of Kakutani’s ﬁxed-point theorem to
establish the existence of a pair p∗, z∗ such that z∗ = ζ(p∗) and p∗ = µ(z∗).
The argument underscores the powerful decentralizing property of the pure competitive equilib-
rium: although p is determined at aggregate level, the same price system, taken this time as given by
the n individual producers j (respectively the m individual consumers i) will yield n individual optima
y∗
j (resp. m x∗
i) such that y∗ =
P
j y∗
j (resp. x∗ =
P
i x∗
i). It is therefore optimal in the sense of Pareto.
Thus the pure competitive or Walras equilibrium is characterized by a price system p∗ that realizes:
• m consumption plans x∗
i such that ∀ i : x∗
i is a greatest element of i’s budget set {xi ∈ Xi | px∗
i ≥
pxi,xi,x∗
i ∈ Xi} for the preference pre-ordering i;
• n production plans y∗
j such that ∀ j : y∗
j | py∗
j ≥ pyj,yj,y∗
j ∈ Yj;
• ` markets in equilibrium: z∗ = x∗ − y∗ = 0.
Under our assumptions of convexity of sets and continuous diﬀerentiability of their closure, the
equilibrium and the Walras allocation it supports are unique.
42 Equilibrium mechanism
Beyond a characterization of the pure competitive equilibrium, it is of particular interest for the purpose
of our analysis to look into the underlying convergence mechanism, from the ﬁrm’s viewpoint.
Assume ﬁrm j is initially located at yj —possibly an interior point of its production set Yj— and
behaves as a rational, proﬁt-maximizing agent. Its strategy space Sj ⊂ Yj ⊂ R` is delineated by the
intersection of a closed, convex cone with vertex yj, and Yj. Under our smoothness assumptions, the
cone is equivalent to the half `-space above the hyperplane H crossing yj. Sj is closed and convex as
the intersection of closed, convex sets. Note that as yj tends to y∗
j, the adherence of Sj tends to the
adherence of the cone of interior displacements of Yj at y∗
j, hence to the separating hyperplane H at y∗
j.
In the dynamic setting of repeated games that will be introduced in Section 4, the migration from
yj to y∗
j proceeds through a sequence yj,...yt
j,...y∗
j in Sj, with t marking the consecutive periods of the
game. Similarly to link the general equilibrium framework to the game-theoretic applications of the next
sections, we deﬁne at
j = y
t+1
j −yt
j the act of ﬁrm j at period t. aj is a vector in Aj, the set of feasible acts
opened to j (at time t —we omit the superscript for the sake of clarity). Aj is itself a convex cone in R`:
Aj ⊂ Sj. Sj is in eﬀect the convex hull of a chronological series of At
j. This notation where a strategy is
seen as a sequence of acts within a deliberate framework appears a fair depiction of real-life situations.
Consequently we call yt =
P
j yt
j the state of the industry at period t, and π(at
j) = π(y
t+1
j − yt
j) the
payoﬀ to j associated with the act at
j.
3 Departures
We consider in this section four classes of departures from the perfectly competitive assumptions of the
reference model. They are introduced in an attempt to reﬂect more closely real-life situations:
• the State intervenes in the economy, not only as one particular producer of goods and services, but
also as a policy-maker vested with the power to alter unilaterally the price system2. In the pursuit
of socially preferable (Pareto-superior) outcomes, governments raise taxes and dispense subsidies.
Indeed the second theorem of welfare economics demonstrates that every Pareto-optimal allocation
can be attained by a competitive equilibrium, supported by a suitable redistribution of income. In
practice however, the design of a ‘suitable’ redistribution scheme requires a minute monitoring of
agents’ endowments and preferences. Highly nonlinear tax or price schedules incorporate a revealing
mechanism to extract the necessary information, but prone as they are to the moral hazard and
adverse selection syndromes, they do not prevent the economy from sliding into the second-best
realm;h1i
• Yj is typically a coordinate subspace of R`. A ﬁrm j operates with a limited number of inputs
{−yj}, and produces a limited number of outputs {+yj}, with | − yj| + | + yj|  `. Consequently,
one can deﬁne in Y an arbitrary collection Y of subsets Y h of lower dimension, such that for all h,
Y h is dense in Rh ⊂ R`, and Y = ∪hY h. Note that Y is not a partition of Y , as we do not impose
that the subsets Y h be pairwise disjoint. On the contrary, the Y hs are expected to be pairwise
connected by at least one common coordinate. Without loss of generality, we may now restrict
2and the distribution of endowments, although this aspect was omitted in the formal presentation.
5the competitiveness game to a more tractable, but collectively equivalent, series of independent
‘subgames’ (the term is misused here) featuring a lesser number of players;h2i,h3i
• agents do not have complete and immediate information on everyone else’s endowments and be-
haviour, and on the resulting price system and state of the economy. One particular way of coping
with the ensuing uncertainty is to take the price `-vector as a stochastic variable known up to
a probability distribution P(p). The upper semi-continuity of the excess demand correspondence
ζ(•) can no longer be ascertained in this case, and the economy generally fails to reach a Walras
equilibrium.
Alternatively, one can adopt to model uncertainty a discrete form, and substitute for a probability
distribution on the states of the economy a set of mutually exclusive, deterministic ‘states of the
world’ assorted with a joint set of contingency claims3. The approach, borrowed from the theory
of risk and insurance, considers that agents hedge against random outcomes of the economy by
specifying commensurate compensation payments. Complete, suitably designed contingent claims
in eﬀect waive the uncertainty constraint, and the economy behaves exactly as a γ-tuple of the
deterministic case, with γ being the number of distinct states of the economy that are likely to
obtain. In addition, a player j ∈ T in a game possesses only partial knowledge —or incomplete
information— about his opponents’ characteristics yk, beliefs and strategy space Sk. Uncertainty
about the state of the world is referred to, in game-theoretic parlance, as ‘moves by nature’. With-
out loss of generality, the latter can be embodied in the particular topology of the initial node —or
information set— in the extensive-form game. Similarly, all the attributes of k that inﬂuence his
decision-making are collapsed in his type λk (Harsanyi (1967)). The set Λk of stochastic types of
player k is taken as ﬁnite, and the stochastic game over the set T of players becomes a deterministic
game over the set T × Λ;
• ﬁnally, we relax the earlier assumption of a uniform distribution of negligible market power over
the set of agents. Through collusion, entry deterrence, product diﬀerentiation or predatory pricing,
ﬁrms strive on the contrary to conquer a dominant position on their markets4. They cease to behave
as price-takers, as they gain in the process the capacity to alter to their advantage the price vector.
The Walras allocation fails to exist, or more generally, the set W of Walras allocations is empty.
Less restrictive concepts are called for to depict the set of equilibria in a broader class of game-
theoretic problems. Prominent among them is the concept of the Core of an economy, deﬁned as
the set C of allocations that are not opposed by any coalition. A coalition is an arbitrary, nonempty
subset Θ of the set T of traders. The members of a coalition j ∈ Θ can accept a given allocation
zT, or prefer on the contrary the allocation zΘ that obtains when trading among themselves —that
is, trade over Θ—, with of course the aggregate net trade being null over T and Θ, respectively:
one cannot redistribute more than is available.
Formally, C = {zT | @ Θ ⊂ T | ∀j ∈ Θ,πj(zΘ) ≥ πj(zT) and πj(zΘ) > πj(zT) for at least one j},
where πj(z•) is the payoﬀ to j resulting from z•. In general, we have W ⊂ C: the set of Walras
3physicists provide yet another treatment of uncertainty where a random outcome such as, for instance, the trajectory
of a particle is regarded as the sum over its probable histories: as long as trapped in its black box with a 0.5 probability of
being hit by lethal radiations, Schr¨ odinger’s cat was considered half-dead and half-alive.
4which is somewhat facilitated by the fact that ﬁrms typically play in a low coordinate subspace Y h of R`—see previous
items.
6allocations is a subset of the Core. The two concepts are shown to coincide (W = C) in the limit
case of an atomless economy with a continuum of traders (Aumann (1964), Hildenbrand (1974)).
These critical departures from the assumptions underlying our base paradigm lead in practice to
‘market failures’ and weaken somewhat the ability of the reference model to lend operational guidance
in a variety of real-life situations. Complementary tools are necessary to grasp the complex interactions
embedded in actual problems such as, in particular, the design of a conducive industrial policy in a
fast-evolving environment.
Game theory has proven amenable to an expanding class of applications in industrial economics;
we propose to explore here the insights it aﬀords into the process of policy formulation. The objective is
not to deﬁne an altogether new game for that particular application, interesting though the exercise may
be. We rather identify a readily speciﬁed game that be close enough to the object of our concern as to
yield there valuable conclusions.
A game G features a set T of agents —or players— j who each select an act aj from a set Aj ⊂ Sj,
their strategy space (see Section 2) and in return obtain a payoﬀ πj. Thus, G ≡ G(T,A,π). Clearly
aj aﬀects the other players’ payoﬀ as well, else the game is wrongly speciﬁed. The game is of a non-
cooperative nature when the agreements between the players are not enforceable. The agents can play
simultaneously (static games) or sequentially (dynamic games).
The formal representation of the information available to the players at any point of time is crucial
to complete the depiction of the game. A player j founds his move or act aj upon his information set at
that point of time. Part of the information set is common knowledge, that is, player j knows about it,
knows that his opponents know it and know that he knows it, ... ad inﬁnitum (Aumann (1976)). Part
relates to information about other players’ types and moves. The game is said of incomplete information
if players do not have full knowledge of their opponents’ types; it is said of imperfect information if
they do not fully observe their opponents’ moves (see Section 5 for a more elaborate treatment of the
information issue).
A pure strategy maps an information set Ωj onto a deterministic act aj. Agents may also choose
to randomize between diﬀerent moves, for instance in a discrete case by playing either a1 with probability
P(a1), or a2 with probability P(a2) = 1 − P(a1). Such a strategy is referred to as a mixed strategy.
It amounts to deﬁning a probability distribution for each aj in Aj. The stochastic act (resp. strategy
space) is noted αj (resp. ˚ Aj), and the expected values of the mixed-strategy payoﬀs are the weighted
sums of their pure strategy counterparts: in our example where j chooses either a1 or a2, the resulting
mixed-strategy payoﬀ writes E(π(a1)) = P(π(a1)) + (1 − P)(π(a2)).5
There are two ways of describing a game: the normal form is fully speciﬁed by G(T,A,π) and
is represented, in the two-player case, by a table indicating in rows the possible moves a1 of player 1,
in columns the possible moves a2 of player 2, and in the cells the pairs (π1,π2) of payoﬀs accruing to
the players under every possible combination of moves. The extensive form of a game is depicted by a
tree indicating the nodes or information sets available to each player before acting, the order of play, the
strategic options faced by the players and, at the bottom of the tree, the cumulative payoﬀs for each one
of the players. When a node is a singleton, the player is fully informed of the previous moves whereas
5convention: j denotes a random act, whose payoﬀ is necessarily expressed in terms of an expected value. Therefore the
symbol E(•) is redundant, and will be dropped for the sake of clarity.
7an information set containing more than one element suggests on the contrary a situation of imperfect
information. The structure of the game fully mirrors the structure of the information available to the
players, and is assumed to be known to all players (common knowledge).
A fundamental assumption is that every agent behaves rationally, and presumes that his opponents
are rational decision-makers as well (the players are said to share common beliefs). Thus posing an act
aj not only reﬂects the past information available to j at that point of time, but it also captures the
anticipated moves by the other players in reaction to aj. Some of the possible moves in an extensive-form
game will deﬁnitely ﬂunk the rationality test. For instance, the last player will consider no other option
than the one that brings him the highest immediate return: any other strategy is clearly dominated.
Guessing the last player’s ﬁnal move, the last-but-one player will act accordingly, and so on. The process
of ‘folding back’ the tree, or more generally, the iterated elimination of dominated strategies is called
‘backward induction’ and has been developed into a formal algorithm (Kuhn (1953)). It always admits a
solution in games of perfect information; the conclusion, or dominant strategy, is unique when there are
no two terminal nodes that would give a player identical payoﬀs.
However, the backward induction process fails to deliver a conclusion in games of imperfect in-
formation. A more general —and necessarily weaker— characterization of the set of ‘reasonable’ —that
is, non-dominated— strategies is provided by the concept of Nash equilibrium. The set N(G) of Nash
equilibria of the game G(T,A,π) is deﬁned as
N = {a∗
j | ∀j ∈ T and aj ∈ Aj,πj(a∗
j,a∗
−j) ≥ πj(aj,a∗
−j),−j ∈ T\{j}}.
Replacing aj, Aj by αj, ˚ Aj yields the immediate extension of the concept to the realm of mixed
strategies. In other words, a player j takes as given the |T| − 1 acts a∗
−j and chooses accordingly the
act a∗
j that maximizes his payoﬀ πj. j is said to react to a∗
−j; his behaviour is represented by a reaction
correspondence rj(a∗
−j) or, in the more general case of mixed strategies, rj(a∗
−j) = argmaxπj(αj | α∗
−j),
where argmax(•) = {α∗
j ∈ ˚ Aj | πj(α∗
j | α∗
−j) ≥ πj(αj | α∗
−j)}.
Since the stochastic payoﬀ is constructed as an aﬃne transformation of the probability distribution
over the acts (and is therefore homeomorphic to a simplex), πj is continuous and quasi-concave, and
argmax(•) is a nonempty, upper semi-continuous correspondence. Let r be the Cartesian product r =
×j∈T rj. r(•) is the aggregate reaction correspondence over the set of agents. It both depends on, and
inﬂuences, the individual acts αj.
The problem is therefore reminiscent of the excess demand correspondence in general equilibrium
theory (see Section 1). It invites the recourse to a ﬁxed-point argument. Note that r(•) maps, for
each agent j, the probability simplex —a compact, convex set— into the stochastic set of acts ˚ Aj.
Furthermore, r(•) is upper semi-continuous as the product of upper semi-continuous correspondences.
Therefore applying Kakutani’s ﬁxed-point theorem yields the conclusion that every ﬁnite n-player game
admits a mixed-strategy equilibrium (Nash (1950)).h4i
4 Intertemporal eﬀects
In contrast to static games of perfect or imperfect information, dynamic games allow for intertemporal
eﬀects such as learning, reputation, signalling, or signal jamming. A discount factor δ, δ ∈ [0,1] that
8measures today’s valuation of tomorrow’s payoﬀ: δπt+1 also oﬀers more realistic insights into a class of
time-dependent problems in industrial economics.h5i
In a dynamic game, a player j adopts an act aj that does not necessarily maximize his imme-
diate return —as in the concept of Nash equilibrium—, but rather the valuation of his ultimate payoﬀ
considering the anticipated moves a−j of the other players in reaction to aj. In other words, some of
the Nash equilibria are not ‘reasonable’ in a dynamic game; a more restrictive, time-consistent concept
of equilibrium is obtained by running the backward induction argument to weed out unreasonable Nash
solutions.
The following two-player, two-period game introduced the concept of subgame perfection to char-
acterize a class of ‘reasonable’ equilibria in dynamic games (Selten (1965)):
Player 2
` r
Player 1 L 2,2 2,2
R 3,1 1,0
Each player chooses between two acts, left or right: A1 ≡ {L,R} and A2 ≡ {`,r}. The resulting payoﬀs
are indicated in the cells: if 1 plays L and 2 plays r, the strategy is noted (L,r) and the associated
payoﬀs are (2,2). The game admits two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, (L,r) and (R,`). Clearly player
1 choosing L would trigger strictly superior outcomes for player 2; player 2 may thus attempt to coerce
his opponent into playing L by threatening to play r (in which case 1 would obtain a payoﬀ 1). If player
1 bows to the pressure and plays L, they reach the Nash equilibrium (L,r). However on second thought,
1 may realize that the threat is not credible: if he ignores it and plays R anyway, 2 behaving rationally
will have no option but play `, and they reach the other Nash equilibrium (R,`).
The set of subgame-perfect equilibria is derived from the set of Nash equilibria, after eliminating
from the latter its elements based on such empty threats. A subgame is a particular subset of the original
game, that responds to a precise deﬁnition. An equilibrium will be subgame perfect if it is optimal not
only in the original game, but in every one of its subgames as well.
The illustrative game described above in its normal form admits two subgames: itself and the one
that obtains ‘after’ player 1 plays R. Playing r is dominated for player 2 by playing `, as his payoﬀ in the
former case is either 2 or 0, against 2 or 1 in the latter. However, he is conﬁdent that his threat will deter
his opponent from playing R, such that the adverse situation (R,r) for him is actually a zero-probability
event. Therefore in the subgame where player 1 does play R, r is not optimal and the game admits only
one subgame-perfect equilibrium, namely (R,`).
Through the observation of earlier moves in dynamic games, a player gains a more accurate picture
of his opponent’s type by applying Bayes’ rule of conditional probabilities.
Let λj be the type of player j. λj is stochastic, and known therefore up to a prior probability distribution
P(λj). From the observation of previous moves, the players construct a statistical model specifying
for all aj and λj the conditional probability P(aj | λj). By combining prior knowledge with empirical
9information, they infer a more accurate probability measure of j’s type through the posterior densities
P(λj | aj) =
P(λj) • P(aj | λj)
P
k6=j P(λk) • P(ak | λk)
An application of Bayesian inference in dynamic games is found in the basic signalling game featuring two
players with asymmetric information: player 1’s type λ1 is stochastic, while player 2’s type is common
knowledge and can therefore be omitted altogether.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game is deﬁned as a set of strategies a∗
1(λ1),a∗
2(α1) and
posteriors P(λ1 | α1) such that
a∗
2(α1) ∈ argmax
X
P(λ1 | α1) • π2(α1,a2,λ1)
α∗
1(λ1) ∈ argmaxπ1(α1,a∗
2(α1),λ1)
P(λ1 | α1) is obtained by application of Bayes’ rule.
That is, player 2 maximizes his expected payoﬀ, determined by his act a2 and player 1’s stochastic act
α1 weighted by the posterior beliefs player 2 holds about player 1’ s type. Player 1 reacts optimally to
a∗
2 and incorporates in his decision its anticipated impact on player 2’s choice. In a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, the two players react optimally to each other’s moves: here also, the existence proof of an
equilibrium relies on a ﬁxed-point argument, although a complete veriﬁcation here of the assumptions
underlying Kakutani’s theorem would require a much ﬁner characterization of the game.
Let us now enlarge the same game to a team featuring on the one hand the policy-maker, and
the ﬁrms on the other. The overriding objective of the game is to strengthen the competitiveness of the
industry, and a —non-cooperative— collection of acts need to be taken to that end.
The initial state is described by a point y in R` (see Section 2). Every individual act comes at a
cost, say, the cost for the ﬁrm to upgrade its technology, or the opportunity cost incurred by the State
when granting tax exemptions to speciﬁc industries. Hopefully the consolidated outcome of the joint
decision will be greater than the total cost, such that the system as a whole has migrated to a superior
state y∗. However, the distribution of the total payoﬀ among the agents may not be commensurate to
the respective contributions —that is, the costs associated to the individual acts—, thereby leading to a
Pareto-ineﬃcient situation.
This in turn raises the moral hazard problem, when the non-observability of individual merits in
the joint outcome prompts agents to reveal voluntarily distorted preferences in anticipation of higher
personal gains.
Recent developments in economic theory depict the multi-agent moral hazard problem by a basic
game between n players j,j = 1,...,n. In our case, the players are enterprises, related businesses and
government sharing responsibility in the competitive strength of a particular industry (see Chapter 6).
Each player simultaneously chooses an act aj within a set of feasible acts Aj (say, the ﬁrm decides to
upgrade its technology, or the government revises the import tariﬀs. Clearly a cost is attached to every
act). Collectively the agents implement a joint act a represented by a vector a = (a1,...,aj,...,an). A
stochastic outcome function maps the individual act aj onto the collective act a through a probability
distribution P(a | aj) on a ﬁnite set A of collective outcomes.
Each player j is characterized by a payoﬀ function πj(a) = πj(aj,a−j) dependent on the joint act a.
Thus the stochastic payoﬀ for player j is measured by the weighted sum πj(a) =
P
j πj(aj,a−j)•P(a | aj).
10However in view of the non-observability of individual actions mentioned earlier, the act aj is not known
to any other agent than j, except through the randomized form of a probability distribution αj deﬁned
over ˚ Aj.
Thus in a stochastic model, one can calculate the payoﬀ πj(α) and deﬁne accordingly a collectively
eﬃcient joint act α∗ if there is no other action α such that for all j,πj(α) ≥ πj(α∗) and πj(α) > πj(α∗)
for at least one player. It is unlikely, however, that an eﬃcient joint act should spontaneously result from
a non-cooperative game, as there would probably be players who could increase their individual payoﬀ
by unilateral deviations.
Mechanisms must therefore be designed to entice collectively eﬃcient acts in a non-cooperative
game. Such mechanisms must satisfy three criteria:
• a participation, or individual rationality, constraint. Clearly individual payoﬀs from the collective
outcome must outweigh individual costs, else the player will withdraw from the game. In our
case, the entrepreneurs, the suppliers of related services, and the government must ﬁnd a positive
individual return from the collective outcome, or they will no longer participate in the group
decision-making process;
• an incentive-compatibility constraint, which will prevent the player from revealing voluntarily dis-
torted preferences in an attempt to trigger higher personal gains;
• a budget constraint, which states that the total inter-agent transfers cannot exceed the collective
outcome generated by the joint act. Such transfers are indeed required to oﬀset possible losses at
individual level, that might be warranted to maximize the collective outcome.
5 Communication devices
The formalization of the information available to a player when posing an act —selecting an element
of a set— is central to the understanding of economic behaviour in a game-theoretic framework. Intu-
itively, one is tempted to distinguish between ‘background’ or exogenous information, and endogenous
information derived from the game.
In the latter case, we have seen how the concept of Bayesian inference —and the presumption of
Bayesian rationality— helped players update their prior beliefs through the observation of their oppo-
nents’ moves. The moves obviously do not convey the same information whether they are perceived as
deterministic elements of a set of acts (pure strategies), or stochastic elements of the same set (mixed
strategies). The randomness in turn stems from the observation by the players of random signals that can
either be independent (such as the toss of a coin in mixed strategies), or on the contrary nonindependent
(correlated strategies —see below), up to the limit point of being identical to all observers (sunspots, for
instance). A detailed informational model is therefore required to capture the distinctive nature of these
diﬀerent situations, and to formalize the process of information reﬁnement through repeated games.
Through a Nash strategy, every player j ∈ T maximizes his payoﬀ in reaction to his opponents’
acts. In the more general concept of correlated strategies, every player maximizes his payoﬀ given
his subjective probabilities over Ω. Ω is the ﬁnite set of all possible ‘states of the world’ in Savage’s
sense (Savage (1954)). It has as many elements as there are distinct attributes or alternative, complete
11speciﬁcations of the universe, between which agents would care to diﬀerentiate6. It also includes all
possible moves by the other players.
A particular element ω∗ ∈ Ω is necessarily the ‘true’ state of the world. Pursuant to our deﬁnition
of Ω, ω∗ embodies a complete characterization of that state. Nobody knows ω∗ with certainty, but
everyone has a more-or-less accurate perception of it. To picture this, deﬁne for each agent j a partition
Pj in Ω that isolates, loosely speaking, a subset ∆j ⊂ Ω which, j knows, contains ω∗: ω∗ ∈ ∆j ∈ Pj.
It is important to stress that the partition Pj is common knowledge for all j. For instance, a consumer
may know that the true state of the world is a car rather than a bicycle but he ignores whether it is red
or blue. Obviously, | ∆j |> 1∀ j, and ∩j∈T ∆j = {ω∗}, else we would have chosen too ﬁne a speciﬁcation
for the atoms of Ω.
Every player holds prior beliefs about the states of the world, represented by a probability distri-
bution P over Ω (P is considered identical for all players —see Aumann (1974) for a discussion of the
common prior assumption). Given a perceived state of the world ω, each player j will choose an act αj
in ˚ Aj through a mapping, or a mechanism, µj : Ω → ˚ Aj. µj is said to be P-measurable if it respects the
informational content of P, that is, µj(ω1) = µj(ω2) ⇔ ∆j(ω1) = ∆j(ω2).
Let ˚ A ≡ ×j∈T ˚ Aj. | T | independent moves αj(ω) eventually result in a joint act α(ω) ∈ ˚ A, which
in turn yields | T | payoﬀs πj(α). Note that αj, ˚ Aj are stochastic not because j chooses to randomize
over his set of possible acts (as in Section 3 above), but more generally, because the selection of j’s act
is contingent upon a probability distribution over the set of possible states of the world.
A correlated strategy is a mechanism µ : Ω → ˚ A that is P-measurable. The partition introduced
in the topology of Ω allows for a formal representation of the diﬀerent classes of ‘randomness’ discussed
earlier in this section: if the underlying probability distribution P over Ω is degenerate, the correlated
strategy is in eﬀect a | T |-tuple of pure strategies. If P is taken as the joint probability over the
randomization procedures aj → αj ∀j ∈ T, the correlated strategy becomes identical to the | T |-tuple
of mixed strategies.
A correlated equilibrium is reached when every player j maximizes his payoﬀ given his opponents’
subjective probabilities over Ω. The set Ξ of correlated equilibria is deﬁned as: Ξ ≡ {µ : Ω → ˚ A | πj(µ) ≥
πj(µ−j,νj) ∀j ∈ T and any Pµ-measurable mapping ν : Ω → ˚ A}. In other words, when no player can gain
by adopting an alternative, informationally-equivalent strategy. The concept of correlated equilibrium
can be shown consistent with the presumption of Bayesian rationality (Aumann (1974)).
Passing from a pure- to a mixed-strategy game enlarges the space of Nash equilibria. Likewise,
the set of correlated-strategy equilibria is even larger as it contains all convex combinations of Nash
equilibria. More important still, one can ﬁnd correlated-strategy equilibria outside the convex hull of
Nash equilibria. Consider the example of the following game adapted from Aumann (1974):
6for instance, a consumer will diﬀerentiate between a bicycle and a car. But a car is still too coarse a deﬁnition: there are
red cars, and there are blue cars. Suppose that beyond the colour, nobody cares to distinguish further: a blue, convertible
car and a blue, station-wagon car are taken as identical goods by all consumers. Thus the ﬁnest elements of will consist of
the alternative speciﬁcations red car, blue car.
12Player 2
` r
Player 1 L 6,6 2,7
R 7,2 0,0
The game admits two pure-strategy Nash equilibria with payoﬀs (7,2) and (2,7) and one mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium with payoﬀ (4.5,4.5) attained by jointly randomizing between the two pure-strategy
equilibria.
Assume that there are three —equally likely— states of the world, that is, Ω ≡ {ω1,ω2,ω3}. A
communication device sends to the players nonindependent signals to the eﬀect that the private informa-
tion partitions become P1 ≡ (ω1,(ω2,ω3)) and P2 ≡ ((ω1,ω2),ω3): player 1 (resp. 2) is fully informed if
ω1 obtains (resp. ω3) but cannot distinguish between ω2 and ω3 (resp. ω1 and ω2).
If player 1 observes ω1, he is fully aware of the state of the world that prevails but knows that
player 2 is not. Player 1 knows therefore that 2 will not risk playing r by fear of reaching (R,r), and will
safely play `. Thus 1 will play R, and a ﬁrst choice (R,l) obtains. By symmetry when player 2 observes
3, the same reasoning applies and yields the joint selection (L,r).
Consider now the case when player 1 observes (ω2,ω3) and player 2 observes (ω1,ω2). Expecting
2 to randomize equally between ` and r, 1 will ﬁgure that if he plays L his expected payoﬀ is 4, while if
he plays R his payoﬀ is 3.5. Thus he plays L. Similarly, 2 expects 1 to play L or R with equal chances,
and works out that his payoﬀ will be 3.5 or 4 whether he plays r or `, respectively. Thus he chooses `
and they jointly settle for (L,`).
As the three states of the world are equally likely to obtain, the correlated equilibrium is a proba-
bility distribution 1
3, 1
3, 1
3 over the three choices. The expected payoﬀ becomes (5,5), superior to any one
of the three Nash equilibria of the same game.
This is a fundamental result for our purposes: it shows that everything else being equal, players can
achieve superior outcomes (without entering into binding contracts) provided they beneﬁt from correlated,
not necessarily identical, signals. Therefore designing a communication device that generate such signals
can overcome information deﬁciencies.
Consider the following game, endowed with an explicit communication device (Forges (1994) —the
notation mostly follows hers): T is the set of players j, Ω includes all possible, distinguishable states
of the world ω, and P is a common probability distribution over Ω. Each player is characterized by a
private information partition Pj of Ω, a set ˚ Aj of acts αj, and a strategy µj : Ω → ˚ Aj, a P-measurable
mapping from Ω to ˚ Aj. The true state of the world is ω∗ which, j knows, is contained in a subset ∆j ⊂ Ω,
∆j ∈ Pj. A mapping g : ˚ A → M associates to every joint act α a publicly observable signal m.
At the start of the game, every player j chooses an act αj in ˚ Aj contingent upon his information
set ∆j(ω∗). The correlated strategy | T |-tuple α generates a signal m = g(α) = (g ◦µ)(ω) which in turn
allows j to reﬁne his information set into ∆j(ω)∩(g ◦µ)−1(m)7. The mechanism µ ≡ ×j∈T µj is said to
be self-fulﬁlling if every player j had correctly anticipated the impact of the collective act α —of which
he contributes only a component— when choosing αj = µj(ω). Therefore after updating his information
7We must also posit that the composite mapping g ◦ µj respects the information partition Pj for all j, that is, given g,
µj is Pg◦µ-measurable ∀j ∈ T.
13set with (g ◦ µ)−1(m), every player j sticks to his original strategy µj.
Imagine now an alternative route from Ω to M, that goes through a public communication device
C = ×j∈T Cj. Every player j feeds the communication device with private information, and we deﬁne a
revelation mechanism σj : Ω → Cj. Note that the more accurate a truthful player can be is by revealing
his information partition Pj.
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Figure 1: A communication device
The device then processes the information into a publicly observable signal m in M, through a
mapping d : C → M. The revelation mechanism σ ≡ ×j∈T σj is incentive-compatible if it ultimately
yields the same public signal m as the one derived from the observation of the actual acts α ≡ ×j∈T αj.
In other words, σ is incentive-compatible provided (g ◦ µ)(ω) = (d ◦ σ)(ω).
The conclusion of this section is that if the mechanisms at play are both self-fulﬁlling and incentive-
compatible, a public communication device can yield higher payoﬀs in correlated equilibria by feeding
every player j with more accurate information ∆j(ω∗) ∩ (d ◦ σ)−1(m) before he chooses an act αj =
µj(ω).h6i
6 Applications
h1i Public interventions in a transition economy should aim at densifying the commodity `-space and
strengthening the interactions between markets:
• through price-related policy instruments such as tax or tariﬀ incentives, private ﬁrms and consumers
can be invited to locate in sparsely populated coordinate subspaces of R` and pick up economic
activities that were otherwise absent from the country;
• alternatively, the State can produce services (that is, lend institutional support) and goods that
for various reasons do not appeal to private ﬁrms or which on the contrary are so pervasive as to
suggest signiﬁcant externalities or lead to a dominant position.
The general equilibrium perspective aﬀords new insights into the role of the State. For instance, the ﬁrst
item must not be cursorily dismissed as a resurgence of plain old import-substitution production patterns:
the general equilibrium approach is far more comprehensive as it embraces all kinds of economic activity
14—production, consumption as well as external trade (import and exports) to balance domestic excess
demand correspondences.
h2i The current appeal for regional development or for industrial clusters can equally be visual-
ized against the backdrop of a general equilibrium model: narrowing down the economic space along
geographical or industrial concentration lines can be seen as an attempt to take advantage of a tighter
web of linkages observed or more easily created within a coordinate subset of R`. The risk however is
that operating in a microcosm may well conceal real opportunities elsewhere and obliterate competitive
pressures, ... the resulting situation coming close indeed to the inward-looking development strategies of
the 60s-70s. There is therefore a case for linking such local initiatives into an encompassing framework.
h3i Increased competitive pressures often push ﬁrms to focus on their core activities and spin oﬀ,
or outsource, the related services required. The trend is thus pointing towards ever stronger market
concentration, over ever sharper segments of the manufacturing activities. This suggests that there is no
fundamental diﬀerence between classical cost-competition and niche strategies. In other words, there is
a continuum of ﬁrm’s behaviour of which the pure niche strategy is an asymptotic case.
h4i The general agreement on tariﬀs and trade (GATT) rests on the premise that ‘international
trade is good for you’. However the argument is obviously not compelling enough to lead the players that
is, GATT’s member countries to a Nash equilibrium in a strictly non-cooperative game: on the contrary,
the players have found that they can gain from unilateral deviations. Thus they collectively called upon
a mediator —the World Trade Organization (WTO)— to monitor the agreements and enforce their
implementation. The global game of international trade acquires in the process a distinct, cooperative
touch. The interesting question now is whether the outcome is ‘coalition-proof’, that is, it is such that no
coalition or subset of players can jointly gain by deviating from the party line and adopting inter alia a
collusive behaviour. The proliferation of sub-WTO groupings such as the EU, ASEAN or NAFTA tends
to suggest the contrary.
h5i The discount factor δ in dynamic games actually combines the inﬂuences of two distinct issues:
• the length of the time interval between two consecutive rounds of the game; and
• the impatience of the players, or the importance they attach to the time variable.
Both will be instrumental in shaping a ﬁrm’s strategy. In an industry characterized by protracted
negotiations around large orders (δ → 0), the prospect of the next order is somewhat remote, and the
discounted valuation of the corresponding payoﬀ is small. Firms therefore may be tempted to cheat, at
the risk of losing their credibility (reputation games). A limit example is the ‘Tirana Sheraton’ project,
where an entrepreneur sold equity in a future ﬁve-star complex to be erected in the centre of the Albanian
capital, ... before ﬂeeing the country. In the other end of the discount interval, impatient traders engaged
in rapid, over-the-counter exchanges will be more easily lured by the potential beneﬁts of collusion.
h6i A public communication device can therefore facilitate the convergence between individual
strategies and public policies in a highly uncertain environment. Refer for an illustration to our subsection
3 and consider a competitiveness game featuring n−1 ﬁrms and the policy-maker in a transition economy.
A relevant state of the world ω, for the purpose of our analysis, can be reduced here to a collection of n
points yj in R` together with a joint `-vector of prices. The state of the world being uncertain translates
into a particular topology of Pj, such that | ∆j(ω∗) | 1∀ j. A public communication device is introduced
15to collect from the players private data through a revelation mechanism σj(ω), pool it into σ(ω) before
broadcasting the outcome as a publicly observable signal m = (d◦σ)(ω). Observing m, the players reﬁne
their private information: ∆j → ∆j ∩ (d ◦ σ)−1(m) ∀ j, and select accordingly an act αj = µj(ω) where
ω is now contained in an information set (∆j ∩ (d ◦ σ)−1(m)) ⊂ ∆j. The strict inclusion sign holds as
long as (d ◦ σ)−1(m) 6= {∅}.
7 Some practical considerations
Until the statistical apparatus of the country generates reliable and accurate data, and the economic
information circulates more rapidly among the members of the society, there is a need for practical tools
to support decision-making in a partial equilibrium framework. In an era of globalization of economic
activity, ﬁrms are exposed to competitive pressures hitherto unknown to them. If they are to survive
and indeed, strive in the newly opened environment, they must rapidly take a variety of far-reaching
decisions to improve their performances and strengthen their competitiveness. Ultimately, their success
will depend on a series of strategic choices made independently and simultaneously by their business
partners and any other related ﬁrm with a stake in their industry. In transition countries, the market’s
invisible hand often remains ... invisible and fails to provide the publicly observable signals necessary to
guide independent plays in a non-cooperative game.
There is a need to create a public communication device, that is, a procedure capable of eliciting
from the ﬁrms private information and recycling it into a generic signal to steer individual decisions.
The device ought to be designed according to precise speciﬁcations: it must prove incentive-compatible
and entice ﬁrms to reveal truthful information; its output must be relevant and useful to the ﬁrms by
enabling them to reﬁne their information partitions and select self-fulﬁlling strategies; and above all, it
must be both sturdy and ﬂexible enough to sustain operations under occasionally rough and unpredictable
conditions.
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation hints at a neutral mediator who will respect the conﬁdentiality of the private
information disclosed to him. It also relates to some extent to the second speciﬁcation, as ﬁrms will be
more forthcoming when they see private gains in revealing information. The second speciﬁcation suggests
a device based on a virtual approximation of the real game. To remain tractable, the scope of the device
must be limited to an industry, a region or a cluster of ﬁrms. Of course, several such ‘subgames’ (again,
the term is misused) can be analyzed simultaneously: the general equilibrium framework thus provides
a background against which to ascertain their mutual consistency. Lastly, the device must be amenable
to local servicing and maintenance, and capable of accommodating future extensions to solve speciﬁc
problems.
A prototype under development follows the standard architecture of an expert system, that is, a
knowledge base gathering the judgements of a large number of experts faced with strategic decisions at
ﬁrm level, a database relating to the particular problem under review, and an inference engine that com-
pares the symptoms observed in the case-study with the generic information contained in the knowledge
base, and elicits from the comparison diagnosis and strategic orientations.
Originally devised to operate at enterprise level, the prototype has rapidly demonstrated its eﬀec-
tiveness at the aggregate level of industries or regions. It is now being ﬁtted with a policy interface to
16simulate the impact on the industry of various policy moves. The data collected in the process will help
the ﬁrms reﬁne their information before taking a strategic action; as a data generation mechanism or
public communication device, the procedure meets the critical requirement of incentive-compatibility: it
is introduced by a neutral entity, the data outputs are published only in aggregate form, and ﬁrms have
a strong incentive to reveal truthful information as it will in the ﬁrst place serve the formulation of their
own business plans.
8 Conclusion
The paper focussed on the interaction between government and business; the analysis has recast the
industrial policy debate in terms of a non-cooperative game between the ﬁrms and the policy-maker. A
variety of real-life situations can now be assessed against this general background.
While a number of theoretic issues did not receive here the full treatment they deserve, the paper
has nevertheless delivered some pragmatic recommendations of pressing relevance in developing and
transition countries. In a ﬁrst category are the broad speciﬁcations of a public communication device
to compensate for the limited eﬀectiveness of still timid market forces. But a concomitant class of
recommendations immediately arises, in terms of far-reaching programmes to overhaul the analytical
capacities of the policy-making apparatus.
Training packages have been designed and implemented to support the civil servants in their new
responsibilities; they tend to focus on pervasive issues in a market economy such as tax regime, trade
policy or ﬁnancial reforms. However, the caveats generally associated with the underlying paradigm
highlight the need for additional capacity-building initiatives geared somewhat more explicitly to the
restructuring process in motion. This is particularly clear in the manufacturing sector where the ﬁrm
support of the public authorities is sorely required, but often proves inadequate by lack of expertise in
an altogether new and complex range of skills.
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